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AllocativeEfficiency
Theeffects of exchange control regimes on efficiency within a developing
country can be analyzed at several levels. In this chapter, we focus essentially
on the so-called static efficiency effects—for example, the effects on the
allocation of investments among alternative activities,' on utilization of
capacity, on holdings of inventories, and so on—while deferring to later
chapters the consideration of effects on domestic saving and capital forma-
tion, export performance, entrepreneurship, and innovation, which are con-
sidered to be the "dynamic" aspects of economic efficiency.
This division of efficiency effects, it can hardly be overemphasized, is
both artificial and semantically loaded against the set of effects described as
static and in favor of the effects termed dynamic. Thus, if the (static) efficien-
cy of investment allocation drops so that the same inputs produce less output
than is feasible, surely it will, ceteris paribus, reduce the growth of the
economy.2 The static effects of a foreign trade regime may thus impair the
economy's growth far more effectively than the sum total of the dynamic ef-
fects. In fact, one of the significant conclusions of the Project, which will
become evident to the reader in the following analysis, is that the static effects
of exchange control regimes of Phase II variety seem to be generally adverse
and significant whereas their dynamic effects, when decipherable from the
complex evidence as significant, may be adverse and hence reinforcing in
character rather than beneficial and offsetting to the static, adverse effects.
In this chapter, we first discuss at a very broad level (in Section 1) some
evidence from countries in the Project regarding the productivity of invest-
ment during Phase I! regimes and outside thereof. We next consider, more
directly, for Phase II regimes (1) the possible malallocation of investment
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among alternative activities using the estimates gathered on this question in the
framework of domestic resource costs (DRCs) in most of the country studies
(in Section II); (2) the possible accentuation of underutilization of capacity
(in Section III); (3) the possible impact on holding of increased inventories (in
Section IV); and (4) the diverse effects on choice of techniques, and so on,
due to the artificial cheapening of capital goods imports that typically obtains
under exchange control regimes (in Section V).
I. SOME OVERALL INDICATORS
The simplest, but least reliable, method of establishing a link between the
foreign trade regime and the economic efficiency of an economy is to examine
indicators of "productivity" for possible association between levels, and turn-
ing points therein, and the state of the trade regime. For Ghana, Israel, and
Chile, this has been attempted by the country authors, using different in-
dicators, and drawing pointed attention to the inadequacy of such an ap-
proach. They also stress that its results are consistent with the hypothesis, based
on a priori argumentation, that Phase II regimes, in generally leading to a
disregard of opportunity costs in allocational decisions, should cause a decline
in efficiency (in the manner discussed at length in the subsequent sections of
this chapter).
Clark Leith, for Ghana, cites the fact that both investment and its produc-
tivity, as measured by the marginal output-capital ratio, declined sharply in
the period following the exchange control restrictions since 1960 and 1961, in
fact plummeting to very low levels in the late Nkrumah period and during the
austerity of the early N.L.C. (National Liberation Council) government,4 and
beginning to recover only thereafter. In itself, of course, this broad level form
of argument is not compelling. In particular, shifts in the marginal output-
capital ratio may result from marked changes in the composition of output
and may reflect exogenous factors such as large declines (or increases) in
agricultural output around the trend. Nonetheless, Leith argues that it is sug-
gestive of a possible relationship. He then develops arguments to show that the
exchange control regime during the 1960s did produce specific inefficiencies.
For Israel, Michael Michaely, who can contrast a Phase IV period with
Phase II, argues the many reasons why inefficiency and waste should be
widespread when QRs are intensive and observes that a shift to price deter-
mination of imports would lead, at the time of the shift, to a particularly large
increase in productivity because this waste would be reduced.5 He then uses
Kendrick-type estimates of overall factor productivity, based on Gaathon's
earlier work, for the period 1951 to 1965, dividing the period into three
subperiods: (1) 1951-1952, peak time of the QR system; (2) 1953-1955, the84 ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
main years of transition to price regulation; and (3) the following Phase IV
years from 1956 to 1965. His conclusions from this evidence are that the data
are in conformity with the postulated effect of QRs, namely, the rate of in-
crease of productivity rose markedly from 1951-1952, the peak period of QRs,
to 1953-1955, the period of rapid transition to the price mechanism as a means
of regulating imports as well as other activities in the economy. For the
economy as a whole (excluding housing and the public sector), the rate of in-
crease of productivity was not as fast in the decade from 1956 to 1965 as in the
transitional years, 1953-1955—though this is not true for the manufacturing
sector, and it was faster than in the period of controls, 195 1-1952. Michaely is,
however, careful to argue that the causal connection between severe QRs and
slow increase in productivity does not follow necessarily from their coex-
istence. This is especially because the Israeli economy during its earlier years
underwent fast and radical changes in size and structure. In particular, the
rapid increases in productivity in the first few years following 1951 could have
occurred because "immigrants, who made up a large fraction of the popula-
tion, may have been placed in jobs they were not suited to during the period of
mass immigration, andlatersought and found more appropriate
occupations." For this and other reasons,
productivity should have been expected to rise rapidly in the years 1953-1955 even
without a change in the QR regime. Therefore it cannot be claimed that the whole
of the rapid rise that actually took place in those years should be attributed to the
change in the exchange system. Unfortunately, there is no feasible way of
distinguishing the various factors that contributed to the increased productivity
of that time. Thus, it may only be stated that the hypothesis that a shift from QRs
to price regulation of the economy leads to faster growth through increased pro-
ductivity is at least not contradicted by the facts of the Israeli experience.6
For Chile, Behrman has a detailed analysis of the relationship between
liberalized and restrictive regimes, on the one hand, and the productivity of
capital in the shape of the marginal output-capital ratio, on the other hand. He
concludes that the degree of restrictionism has been inversely associated with
such productivity, pointing both to efficiency-type effects of restrictionist
trade regimes (e.g., the inability to import economical second-hand goods
under restrictionist regimes, the possible increase in inventory holdings, and
the shift to inefficient domestic equipment) and to compositional effects (e.g.,
shift of investment to sectors with higher capital intensity during restrictionist
regimes).7 On balance, Behrman's arguments and evidence imply that the
(Phase II) restrictionist regimes reduced the marginal output-capital ratio and
that this, in turn, did imply efficiency effects rather than purely compositional
differences in the pattern of investments under Phase II and more liberalized
regimes.INTERACTIVITY ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES: DRCs ET AL. 85
H. INTERACTIVITY ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES: DRCs ET AL.
There are several reasons to conclude that the exchange control regimes
studied in the countries in the Project were ill-suited to the task of having the
"true" costs and benefits reflected in economic decision-making as, for exam-
ple, in regard to production, inventory-holding investment levels, and tech-
niques in the economy. This is not to assert that, in principle, one cannot com-
bine direct allocations (as in the operation of a QR regime) with an optimal
allocation and utilization of resources. Rather the argument relates to the
operation of the "visible hand" system, as typically observed in the developing
countries examined.
The reader's assessment of the prospects of having a rational allocation
and utilization of resources under exchange control regimes, however, is cer-
tain to be influenced by the evidence that we will discuss for these countries.
At the outset, it would be useful to keep two points in mind. First, the
foreign trade regime in some cases—as in India and Pakistan in par-
ticular—was merely supportive, in the main, of the allocation of resources that
was already decided upon via industrial targeting within the context of overall
plans and which was buttressed by an elaborate industrial-licensing machinery.
However, even in these countries, one can attribute more of a direct causal role
to the foreign trade regime in influencing the pattern of investments. For ex-
ample, in India, there was a growing small-scale sector that escaped industrial
licensing and responded to market incentives, and additionally, there was
much actual investment, even in the large-scale sector, that could not be
targeted in sufficient detail in advance and which came up for licensing in
response to market incentives, of course. Furthermore, while the foreign trade
regime may have been supportive in regard to investment allocations, that
feature certainly did not preclude the regime from having substantial effects in
other areas of resource utilization, for example, on capacity utilization, inven-
tory holdings, and so on.
Second, the evidence that we will present is not fully conclusive in each of
its constituent elements. However, taken as a whole, it is very persuasive and
supportive of the thesis that exchange control regimes of Phase II variety have
adverse effects on the efficiency of the economic system. Thus, when we can
show that the methods of allocation used by exchange control authorities
systematically ignored economic costs and returns and when it is then shown
that the returns on different activities that have emerged under this regime
diverge greatly from one another, it would seem to be reasonable to conclude
that the former has something to do with the latter. In the analysis that
follows, however, we will be careful to spell out the caveats that must not be
forgotten in reaching our conclusions as we work through each argument bear-
ing on the matter at hand.86 ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
A. Evidence on Allocation Criteria
The task of securing information on the criteria used for the allocation of im-
ports among alternative sectors and uses is not merely tedious but difficult
and, at times, impossible because such information is often withheld from
public scrutiny. The only countries in the Project for which such information
and analysis are presented, in consequence, are India, Turkey, Chile, Egypt,
and Colombia.8 For the first two countries, detailed procedures of allocation
are set out and analyzed while the Chilean and Egyptian accounts are
somewhat more sketchy. The Colombian study focuses rather more on a
"revealed preference" analysis of the actual awards of licenses with the aid of
a sample survey.
The evidence on criteria of allocation from the Indian study is the most
pointed on the issue of the meaningfulness of economic terms thereof. While
the reader can do no better than turn to the original discussion by the authors
of the Indian study, their central conclusions are worth noting here.
Distinguishing between the criteria used to award import licenses for raw
materials, for example, among industries and among firms within the in-
dustries, these authors were forced to the view regarding interindustrial alloca-
tions that the "problem was Orwellian; all industries had priority and how was
each sponsoring authority to argue that some industries had more priority than
others?"9 The result was that the bureaucrats tried to hold the overall alloca-
tions confidential and fell back in the interest of safety and objectivity on
criteria of "fairness," which typically implied allocations pro rata to capacity
installed, or employment, or shares defined by past allocations, or similar
rules of thumb. The allocations within industries, among alternative
claimants, were even more evidently governed by equal-shares criteria, related
to capacity installed (in the main). It is evident from their analysis that these
criteria were not intended to create more efficiency. Rather, they created
sheltered existence for the firms and for the industries by assuring them of
guaranteed and "equal" access to the scarce imports fetching high premiums
in most cases, quite regardless of the efficiency of the firms and the industries.
The allocation of capital goods imports, on the other hand, was subject to
both industrial and import licensing in India. The expansion of capacity by in-
dustry was governed by the actual exercise of such licensing machinery as also
by the overall sets of targets laid down in the five-year plans for most in-
dustries. However, the industrial composition of expanding capacity was
governed by macro-economic models which could, for obvious reasons, not
take into account the detailed costs and benefits at the micro-level. In essence,
therefore, one has to conclude that the targeting of industrial expansion by
fairly minute detail was of a nature that militated against the reflection of op-
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principle the licensing of capital goods imports to buttress this pattern of in-
dustrial expansion was, in turn, counterproductive of economic efficiency.
The evidence on the allocation mechanism in Turkey, Chile, Egypt, and
Colombia is not as detailed and focused on the meaningfulness of the criteria
used as in the case of India. However, there is little about the allocation
mechanism in these accounts of the import control regime that is more com-
forting. The only exception perhaps is the evidence produced by Krueger for
Turkey that the import allocations by industry, once decided upon, were
handled for interfirm allocations by the chambers of commerce. Perhaps this
led to a more efficient intra-industrial allocation, but it could equally have led
to an equal-shares approach among members for obvious reasons. The overall
judgment of Krueger on the criteria again is that they did manage to ignore
economic considerations, much as the Indian regime did, and that the ineffi-
ciencies she then documents are traceable to this neglect.
B. Evidence on Inefficient Allocation of Resources
The lack of economically meaningful criteria and the resort to practical rules
of thumb—tempered, no doubt, by varying degrees of evasion (as discussed in
Chapter 4)—imply a disregard of opportunity costs in the allocation of invest-
able resources among alternative activities. In the immediately following
analysis, we will discuss the evidence on such inefficiencies, postponing the
discussion of the efficiency of factor use, given the investment pattern, to later
analysis.
The marshalling of evidence on the misallocation of resources implied by
exchange control regimes, as just described, requires the specification of a
precise analytical framework plus measures of misallocation derived therein.
While, in principle, such an analysis would require a general equilibrium
model, with an explicit social utility function and information on the foreign
trade elasticities for all tradeable commodities and on factor supplies and the
production functions for all activities, plus knowledge of all the distortions in
the system other than those resulting from the exchange control regime, such a
task is clearly next to impossible to accomplish satisfactorily even if the
resources for such an ambitious exercise were to be found.'° In place thereof,
we have resorted to a technique that the country authors recognize clearly as
rather simple (and perhaps simplistic). The domestic resource costs (DRC) of
earning a unit of foreign exchange in alternative activities have been com-
puted, the analyst treating these costs as an approximate index of the differen-
tial returns that are being obtained from different activities, as observed at any
point of time in the economy.88 ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
The DRC index, as applied in practice, measures the returns to domestic
resources in foreign exchange by evaluating the tradeable inputs and outputs at
international prices. In comparing any two DRCs for a pair of activities, then,
we may argue that a marginal shift of domestic resources from the activity
with higher DRC to the other would yield more value added at international
prices with the input of domestic resources unchanged. Hence, the reallocation
would be more efficient; or, in other words, the existing, initial allocation with
differential DRCs in the two activities is inefficient.
This argument is clearly based on the main insight of static trade
theory—that international prices, for a small country, represent opportunity
costs. It also presupposes that the domestic resource costs should be measured
at their "shadow" prices if there are distortions in the economy." Hence, the
analyst should work out the appropriate shadow prices of capital, labor,
foreign exchange, and so on, that are to be used in evaluating the domestic
resources used in each activity. In fact, as is now well known, this is precisely
what divides the measure of effective rate of protection (ERP) from the DRC
concept for, in the absence of such shadow pricing, the two measures will
generally reduce to equivalence.
However, in practice, the shadow prices are not easily estimated.'2 Fur-
thermore, it must be recognized that the demonstration of wide differentials in
DRCs among different activities is not equivalent to arguing that the losses
therefrom must also be correspondingly large: (1) the shift of resources from a
higher DRC activity to a lower DRC activity may run into increasing costs;
and (2) the expansion of output in the lower DRC activity may run into reduc-
ing output prices (as, for example, exports are increased to clear the supplies).
In general equilibrium analysis, moreover, we should be prepared for three
complications. First, as resources are shifted from a number of activities to
other activities, in a shift to optimal equilibrium (e.g., free trade for a small
country), the associated shift of prices may imply that, at the changed tech-
niques, an activity that was higher DRC than another in the suboptimal
equilibrium may become lower DRC than the other in the optimal equilibrium.
Second, evaluation of the activity at, say, c.i.f. international prices in the
suboptimal equilibrium may have to give way to its evaluation at f.o.b. prices
in the optimal equilibrium.'3 Third, the relative expansion and contraction of
different activities in the optimal equilibrium as compared to the suboptimal
equilibrium cannot be forecast in general from the mere examination of the
relative DRCs in the initial suboptimal equilibrium, in consequence.
Having thus set out what we cannot infer from the DRCs estimated in the
country studies, we should then assert that they do give a reasonable clue to the
wide variations in the social returns to different activities in the system, as of
any time. Also, given the lack of attention to prices and costs in the exchange
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evidence that these regimes have indeed brought about the inefficiencies that
these variations in DRCs imply. However, even here we need to be somewhat
cautious on both empirical and conceptual grounds. First, at the empirical
level, only those economists who have tried to work with data on international
prices will appreciate how difficult it is to estimate them meaningfully. In
many exchange control regimes, which work with the principle of QR-
conferred automatic protection, it is rather academic to interview traders and
request reliable quotes on c.i.f. prices of comparable goods. The trade has
been often eliminated too long for there to be anything but a "guesstimate" to
be forthcoming at best. Second, as the pioneering work of Kravis and Lipsey
has shown, the kind of input that is necessary to secure meaningful price
quotations on imports of capital goods on a comparable basis for different
sources (in this instance, between foreign sources and domestic production) is
a conceptually tricky and statistically difficult exercise, lending itself to signifi-
cant errors unless great care is exercised.'4 Third, the price quotations that may
be obtained on actual imports are also subject to manipulation and deliberate
error for the simple reason that the high premiums on imports are occasionally
taken in undeclared income, a practice that certainly obtained in India and was
possibly current in some of the other countries in the Project. In view of these
difficulties in securing any, leave aside reliable, information on international
prices from the market, the DRC calculations in some of the countries in the
Project—Ghana and India being two major countries in this regard—had to
rely on unit values plus premium estimates, each introducing degrees of error
that are difficult to pinpoint with much accuracy. In assessing the DRC
estimates in the various studies on which we report here, therefore, the reader
should bear in mind that reading the fine print on the untidy methods used to
derive the DRC estimates, appearing neatly in their tabulated form, is not
merely a matter of scholarly curiosity but a useful corrective to the tendency to
consider these estimates as yielding more than a rough-and-ready guide to dif-
ferential returns among activities.'5
Conceptually also there is need not to put too strong a weight on this kind
of argumentation beyond the general inference of a broad pattern of
misallocation of resources among different activities. Aside from the caveats
already listed earlier—for example, that a shift to optimal equilibrium could
well make an industry competitive and worthwhile with different tech-
niques—we need to recognize that the view that all DRCs would be equalized
in the absence of distortions, if only the foreign trade regime allowed interna-
tional opportunity costs to be reflected in domestic decision-making, is not
really convincing. This proposition is, after all, based on equilibrium theory.
In practice, the economies with optimal policy frameworks (as defined from
equilibrium theory) would experience disequlibrium and would be continuous-
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changes, variations in international prices, and so on. The variations in DRCs
that would be observed in any one cross section at a single point in time cannot
therefore be meaningfully attributed to the inefficiencies in the trade regime.
This would be "economic overkill" and would at least fail to persuade the
more sophisticated among the proponents of restrictionist exchange control
regimes.
While therefore all these caveats need to be definitely borne in mind and
the reader has been fairly forewarned against easy and facile deductions from
the evidence on DRC variations about to be produced from the countries in the
Project, it does not seem to us to be unreasonable to assume that the process of
freer competition for imports under a more liberalized trade regime than that
characterizing the Phase II regimes in many of our countries during the bulk of
the period studied would have served to bring pressure to bear in reducing the
wide variations in DRCs both within and between industries.
The process of careful qualification and skepticism should not be carried
too far. In this instance, we feel that the weight of the evidence, when we
recognize the documented lack of economic criteria in QR allocations, is cer-
tainly to create more than a prima facie case against Phase II type exchange
control regimes.
We therefore proceed now to put together the evidence on DRC variations
in alternative activities that has been gathered for the countries in the Project.
The estimates of DRCs, adjusted for shadow prices or unadjusted (in which
case they are essentially linked to ERPs, as already noted), in the different
studies in the Project are described in Table 5-1 so that the reader can use the
table as a guide to the country analyses. However, a few observations are called
for here.
The use of only unadjusted DRCs, that is, ERPs, in certain countries (i.e.,
Ghana and India) has been justified by some of these authors primarily in
terms of the inability to spend the necessary recources to devise a suitable
methodology for computing meaningfully the shadow prices for intermediates
and primary factors that would need to be derived in the presence of imperfec-
tions such as quotas, factor market distortions, and so on. On the other hand,
other authors (such as Krueger for Turkey) did use shadow prices. However, it
must be admitted that generally these were not derived in the context of a well-
specified model, so that they should be regarded essentially as "sensitivity"
estimates.
Moreover, the estimates are, strictly speaking, not comparable across the
countries in the Project. The lack of standardization of the activity groups as
also of the concepts in this regard reflected an appreciation of the fact that
data availability, especially the procurement of reliable estimates of interna-
tional prices, varied greatly among countries. Thus, given the large number of
analytically more interesting and novel issues raised by the Project, severalINTERACTIVITY ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES: DRCs El AL. 91
authors considered it undesirable to spend their limited time and resources on
procuring such information at first hand, something that could at best have
been attempted only in a rough-and-ready fashion in any event. Rather, most
of them were willing to use such estimates of DRCs (and ERPs) as were
already available in order to interpret them somewhat along the lines of the
present discussion. Indeed, given the serious conceptual and empirical limita-
tions already alluded to, attempts at manufacturing standardized DRC data
for all the countries would have both been wasteful and lent a spurious sense
of comparability to the resulting numbers.
Looking therefore at the adjusted and unadjusted DRC estimates, as
described in Table 5-1 very summarily, and confining ourselves to a "struc-
tural" view of each country taken by itself, we note that there is indeed
evidence of substantial interindustry variations in DRCs by different sectors.
(For Egypt, this evidence obtains also within the agricultural sector, though we
will say more on this presently since Hansen and Nashashibi do not rely ex-
clusively on DRCs as an index of efficiency losses.)
Thus, for example, Krueger estimates intra-sector DRC variance for dif-
ferent industrial sectors in Turkey during 1968 and/or 1969 at values ranging
from 6.26 for cement up to 278.88 for transport equipment and 890.49 for rub-
ber products.'6 She concludes, in light of this evidence, that the "wide variation
in DRCs on the import-substitution side is indicative of the degree to which en-
couragement of import-substitution has been indiscriminate."7 Similar con-
clusions have been reached in other studies, including principally India and
Ghana.
Recall, however, that inferences of "large" welfare losses from large
variations in DRCs between industries are not persuasive in the face of such
objections as: What would one do with the increased output from the expan-
sion of the low-DRC industries? or, The factors utilized in one industry may
be highly specific to that industry so that there may be rapidly increasing costs
to expansion of outputs in the low-DRC activities. These objections however
lose much of their force if the DRCs among alternative firms within the same
industry show wide variations under Phase II type regimes. Evidence at this
"micro" level is available from some of the Project studies. It is noteworthy
that in these studies the interfirm variations in DRCs were almost as large as
the interindustrial variations in DRCs'8 so that there is no easy way out of the
conclusion that the pattern of investment allocations was less than optimal.
Next, while we have warned against making strong inferences from com-
parisons of dispersions in DRCs between countries, and possibly over time for
the same country (given the relative unreliability of the underlying data), it is
probably worth reporting that the South Korean study suggests somewhat low
interindustrial ERPs dispersion during its Phase IV whereas the Indian study

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note next that the Egypt study additionally attempted to estimate, by fit-
ting agricultural acreage response functions, the actual shifts in acreage that
resulted from the distortions in prices away from international prices and from
quantitative acreage restrictions, which were also practiced in the Egyptian
case.2° Hansen and Nashashibi could not estimate input-coefficient changes
under their alternative assumptions and settled for estimating acreage alloca-
tions to different crops under three alternative conditions: (1) actual domestic
prices and actual (short-term) response functions; (2) actual international
prices and actual (short-term) response functions; and (3) actual international
prices and hypothetical instantaneous long-term adjustment.2' Using predic-
tion (3) as an approximation to optimal allocation of land, they compared it
with the actual allocation and used the difference A, column 4 in Table 5-2, as
an indicator of misallocation due to overall price and quantity distortions.
Comparing it, however, with prediction (1) yielded B, column 5, in Table 5-2.
This was interpreted as a measure of the misallocation due to price distortions
(plus market imperfections implying only short-term response/adjustment).
Finally, a comparison of predictions (1) and (2) yielded C, column 6 in Table
5-2. This was interpreted as a measure of the short-term misallocation due to
price distortions alone.
The Hansen-Nashashibi conclusions, based on these estimates plus
estimates of DRCs and ERPs, are particularly interesting in their implication
in this instance for the use of ERPs (and DRCs) for inferring the direction of
misallocation of resources (a matter to which we turn more directly in the next
subsection) :22
there is no perfect rank correlation between ERP and DRC: nontraded
outputs and inputs are included, and the DRCs are calculated on the basis of im-
puted factor prices to adjust for government controls over land rentals and to
allow for normal profits on capital. It is also recalled that what disturbs the rank
correlation between A, on the one hand, and B and C, on the other, is direct
government interference with acreages, as well as random disturbances, while the
lack of perfect correlation between B and C expresses differences between short-
and long-term misallocation of land.
As is to be expected, neither ERP nor DRC can be used as an indicator of the
long-term misallocations related to both price distortion and direct acreage in-
terference (including random disturbances). The correlation coefficients ERP-A
and DRC-A are insignificant and very low in the latter case.
The ERP could, however, be taken as a relatively reliable indicator of long-
term and a weak indicator of short-term misallocation resulting from price distor-
tions alone. The correlation coefficient ERP-B is significant at the 1 percent level,
and that of ERP-C, at the 5 percent level.
The DRC, finally, can be used as a weak indicator of long-term misalloca-
tion stemming from price distortion, with the correlation coefficient DRC-B
significant at the 5 percent level.INTBRACTIVITY ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES: DRCs ET AL. 97
Note: Spearman's rank correlation coefficient works out as follows,






aAccording to Table 7-1.
bDRCincludes trade and transport margin.
CPredictions 1, 2, and 3 are explained in the text.
Source: Egypt, op. cit., Table 7-5, p. 189.
In conclusion of this subsection, note finally that, in the analysis so far,
we have considered interindustrial variations in DRCs, thus essentially discuss-
ing the pattern of import substitution. Only in Chapter 7,wherewe discuss ex-
port performance, will we discuss the problem of the differential incentives
against exports and in favor of production for the home market, that is, the
problem of the degree of import substitution.23
C. Protective Structure and Industrial Expansion
Before we proceed to an examination of the other inefficiencies traceable to
the exchange control regimes, we may digress briefly on the question, perhaps
inevitable, whether there is any discernible relationship between the protective
structure in the countries in the Project and the growth of specific industries.
Table 5.2.Ranking of Crops in 1963 According to ERP, DRC, and Alternative













(1) (2) (3) (4) (.5,1 (6)
Cotton 7 7 9 6 8
Rice 9 8 8 10 10
Corn 3 5 7 5 7
Millet 4-5 2 5 8 6
Wheat 6 3 10 4 5
Barley 4-5 4 4 3 4
Onions 8 10 2 7 9
Beans 1 1 1 1 1
Lentils 2 6 3 2 2
Cane 10 9 6 9 3






It seems tempting to argue that industries when arrayed in descending order by
their protective rates should also correspondingly be ranked in descending
order by their growth rates or their import substitution ratios. In fact, there is
some analysis in the Project studies, and elsewhere, of correlational type be-
tween the structure of protection by nominal or effective measure and indices
such as growth rates or import substitution ratios, though the evidence seems
to be very mixed.
Thus, Carlos Diaz-Alejandro reports on the earlier work of Hutcheson on
Colombian protection that regresses growth rates successfully on effective pro-
tective rates24 (using the Balassa method for treating non-traded goods as en-
joying zero protection rather than as value-added a la Corden, although the
two methods have a different analytical basis).25 Similarly, Frank and others
report on rank correlation coefficients between various measures of effective
protection, and of effective "incentives" (defined so as to include the effects
of tax rebates, credit preferences, and such incentives) and resource alloca-
tional indices such as import substitution ratios (or export shares for export in-
dustries) and "growth contribution."26 Their results however are generally
poor on the import side." Since the correlation between the share of imports in
total supply and effective incentives is significant and positive, it suggests that
import substitution had progressed the least in these sectors where the level of
effective incentives to domestic sales was high and the "correlations between
effective incentives to domestic sales and growth contributions are not signifi-
cant, though they are negative."27
Additional cross-sectional analysis of this variety was also conducted for
Chile by Jere Behrman to determine if "the price structures created by the in-
ternational economic regimes were associated with growth across sectors.' '28
He found a positive relation between growth in value added and in horsepower
capacity between 1961 and 1967 and the implicit tariff rates (ITRs) for 1967
and also for the incremental ITRs between 1961 and 1967. But this relationship
has little plausibility, as Behrman notes, and may be rationalized only by argu-
ment such as that the ITRs "perhaps ... servedas signals, however, of the
government's intentions to favor particular sub-sectors."29 Interestingly,
Behrman found no evidence for a link between effective rates of protection
and growth. In fact, the only significant non-zero correlation coefficient, us-
ing alternative estimates, was a negative one between effective rates and
growth in production from 1953 to 1961.°
Going beyond the country studies in the Project, however, we may note
two successful sets of regressions, one for Pakistan by Guisinger3' and one for
Nigeria by Oyejide.32 The Pakistani analysis was unsuccessful for import
substitution ratios but successful for growth rates for a twenty-three-industry
study. The Nigerian analysis, for forty-two industries, resulted in successful
regressions of import substitution ratios on effective rates of protection and
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While therefore the results for the different countries are fairly mixed, we
also need to note that the construction of a theoretical rationale for a suc-
cessful regression of import substitution ratios or growth rates in cross-section
analysis is difficult and one many reasonably expect to find no relationships of
the kinds postulated. It should be useful to the reader to spell out why this is
so, taking the import substitution ratio as the dependent variable and effective
tariffs as the independent variable.
1. First of all, since effective tariffs are the independent variable, a basic
difficulty follows. The effect on the import-substitution (production to total
supply) ratio is not uniquely determined by the effective tariff. The same effec-
tive tariff is compatible with different combinations of nominal tariffs on out-
put and inputs and hence with different effects on production and consump-
tion of the output. Hence, even if the partial-equilibrium supply and demand
curves were identical across the industries, the relationship hypothesized
would not follow unless the input-output structure and the structure of
nominal tariffs on each industry's outputs and inputs were identical.
2. In general equilibrium analysis, furthermore, the hypothesis runs into
trouble for the further reason that the theory of general equilibrium tells us
unhappily that, in an n-output (n>2) economy, if more than one price
changes, the direction of output changes cannot be predicted (qualitatively, in
Samuelson's sense). One really has to work out the full general equilibrium
solution.33 This nihilistic conclusion carries over, of course, to a general
equilibrium model with imported inputs as well.34
3. Finally, while the analytical points made above relate to the effects of
the tariffs vis-'a-vis the free trade situation with given resources, the exercises
testing the postulated hypothesis relate often to a situation of growing
resources. But, in this event, there is even less presumption theoretically in
support of the hypothesis. Take a simple two-sector example, using the stan-
dard 2 x 2 model of trade theory. We know from Rybczynski's theorem that
the supply curves of the two commodities will shift differentially rather than
identically, so that even if the supply curves were identical in the initial situa-
tion across activities, they would cease to be so with economic expansion
(unless all factors expanded uniformly). And hence any effect of the tariff
structure on the import-substitution ratio would be "muddied" by this addi-
tional growth effect. This is clearly a pertinent point when one is relating the
import ratios for 1967, for example, to effective protection in 1962 (as in the
Nigerian exercise), a period over which the capital stock may have increased by
nearly 30 percent (assuming a capital-output ratio of 3:1 and an average sav-
ings rate of 15 percent of GNP), and hence certainly in excess of the labor
force.
Thus, even within the confines of our neoclassical economic theory, one
would have difficulties with the hypothesis that higher effective tariffs lead to
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actual LDC economies, these difficulties are accentuated indeed. The growth
of industries is likely to reflect distortions arising from differential trade and
domestic taxes and subsidies, industrial licensing and targeting, anticipation of
tariff protection (as distinct from initial protection) once the industry has built
up to size leading to an effective political pressure group, and so on.35
In addition, there are several major difficulties specific to exchange con-
trol regimes where QRs typically may dominate tariffs (as discussed for the
countries in our Project in Chapter 2), with the notion that observed protective
structures will tell the analyst anything conclusive about growth incentives.
This is a most important and insufficiently appreciated point and the support-
ing reasons therefore need to be spelled out:
1. The translation of import premiums into implicit tariffs implies that
one can treat tariffs and quotas as equivalent. This proposition is increasingly
called into question. As noted in Chapter 2, non-equivalence will arise par-
ticularly under the presence of monopoly elements (not entirely absent from
the scene in some of the countries in the project) and uncertainty (which is, of
course, a fact of life).36
2. The import premiums are likely, except when entry domestically is
totally free, to include elements of rent reflecting artificially controlled entry.37
This is particularly true of countries with explicit industrial licensing (i.e., In-
dia, Pakistan) but also, in lesser degree, of the larger group of countries with
QRs on capital goods imports (e.g., Ghana, Colombia, Turkey, and Egypt).
Moreover, the problem arises partly also from QR-controlled access to im-
ports of necessary raw materials. Unless entry enables a firm to get access to
such imports, the absence of industrial or capital-goods-imports licensing will
not be enough to get a truly free-entry situation. Thus the presence of licensing
of imports of raw materials can, and does, serve to create rents that must be
reflected in the premiums on imported inputs.
3. The fluctuations in the import premiums, which are evident in some of
the countries, also make it somewhat meaningless to attach value to the cross-
sectional translation thereof into one "incentives-determining" picture of the
implicit tariff structure. Few of the entrepreneurs in an exchange control
regime are likely to be ignorant of the fact of changes in incentives inherent in
changing premiums, a fact that presumably accounts for the phenomenon of
some industries actually going through the protective tariff-making process to
have more secure, minimum protection conferred on them by tariff commis-
sions and boards.38
4. Finally, we have already noted (in Chapter 2) that the Phase II type
regimes in most countries operated with rules of "automaticity" in protection.
QRs were used to grant protection as soon as domestic production was started.
Once this "institutional" feature of the system is taken into account, it is easy
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centive effects of guaranteed, "potential" tariff protection, which is clearly a
significant factor on the scene. Thus, the incentive effects on resource alloca-
tion of an array of n observed (implicit) tariffs are surely not identical with the
incentive effects of n observed tariffs plus m expected tariffs. This difference is
further accentuated still when one must reckon with the fact that the m ex-
pected tariffs are not expected with certainty on their specific values but will
depend on the precise extent to which the exchange control authorities would
curtail imports in the face of domestic production.
It is for this set of reasons that the notion of relating tariffs, effective or
nominal,tothepattern of industrial expansion—no matter how
measured—may be lacking in sufficient rationale for countries in Phase II type
exchange control regimes, as indeed our countries have been for the bulk of
the period studied. This may well account for the mixed nature of the
statistical results from various sources reported earlier in this subsection.
On balance therefore we are content to take the view, admittedly less am-
bitious, that the differential ERPs among different activities should be taken
merely to indicate, very broadly indeed, the differential nature of the incen-
tives that exchange control regimes tend to generate. This conclusion, in itself,
is sufficiently interesting and important.39
III. UNDERUTILIZATION OF CAPACITY
We may now turn to the impact that the Phase H type exchange control
regimes, heavily reliant on QRs, had on the returns from given investments, as
distinct from the inefficiencies resulting from misallocation of investments.
One of the major ways in which inefficiencies can arise is through the creation
of excess capacity, which might have been avoided under a more liberal
regime. There are several ways in which such a causal link between exchange
control regimes and the presence of excess capacity can be established. We will
detail these first and then consider the evidence for the countries in the Project
in this regard so that some orders of magnitude can be indicated on the impor-
tance of such effects. Four types of such linkages may be spelled out.4°
A. Incentives to Create Excess Capacity
The tendency to relate equity in allocations of licenses for imported inputs
(directly to producers) to installed capacity should lead to an incentive to
create capacity by linking the availability of premium-fetching imports with
creation of more capacity. Thus, an entrepreneur, with given capacity, which
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pand output through additional utilization of capacity even if it were poten-
tially profitable to do so. The only way he could respond to the profitability of
the industry would be by getting more capacity installed and having some im-
port quota allotted to him on basis thereof. But even if the entrepreneur could
be allowed access to more imports at market prices,4' so that this entrepreneur
could expand utilization of existing capacity, the fact that he would have to
purchase inputs at import-premium-inclusive market prices in order to do this,
whereas expansion of capacity would enable him to expand output by access to
premium-exclusive import allocations, would certainly bias his choice between
these two courses of action toward more capacity creation.42
2. In addition to this effect of the methods of licensing intermediates and
capital goods, there is another mechanism by which excess capacity could be
accentuated in the system via the import-licensing mechanism. In an economic
regime where the efficient firms can bid intermediates from the market away
from the inefficient firms, the former will achieve greater utilization of their
capacity whereas the latter will be forced out. This process, which is also effi-
cient because all capacity is not desirable capacity and undesirable capacity
must be scrapped to avoid larger losses, must necessarily lead to higher overall
rates of capacity utilization than in a regime where inefficient firms
automatically get "squatters' rights" to allocations of imported inputs.
3. An additional way in which the QR regime can affect capacity utiliza-
tion is clearly via the bottlenecks it creates. Undoubtedly, bottlenecks would
arise in any regime; but the ability to correct them is surely constrained for a
number of firms by the difficulty with which remedial imports can be effected.
And this difficulty varies of course with the degree of restrictiveness on the
transferability of import licenses between commodities, firms, and sources.
These bottlenecks add to excess capacity in two ways: (1) by preventing speedy
availability of inputs into a process; and (2) by holding up the importation of
critical spares and balancing equipment that would enable the existing capacity
to be exploited more effectively. The former set of bottlenecks come from the
restrictions built into the inputs-licensing system; the latter relate to both
capital goods and industrial licensing procedures.
4. Yet another way in which the exchange control regime can affect
capacity utilization is by inhibiting the employment of excess capacity for ex-
port markets. While, as we will argue presently, there is evidence that firms
with substantial excess capacity can manage to improve capacity utilization
through exports after liberalization policy changes, we will also note there that
the export effort can be badly compromised, not merely by overvaluation of
the domestic currency but also by the inability of the firms to exploit the in-
tended liberalization of imports meaningfully. Severe restrictions on transfers
of licenses and on permissible imports can prevent quick adjustments in pro-
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flexibility of the import control regime can make it difficult for firms, when
presented with export opportunities to reduce capacity underutilization at low
marginal costs, to exploit these opportunities. If we are to reckon the full im-
pact on capacity utilization from this cause, we should take the primary effect
just discussed and add to it also the secondary effect that is implied by the fact
that additional export earnings would ease the import situation and make
more raw material imports available for further capacity utilization.
B. Evidence on Capacity Utilization
The evidence for these types of adverse effects of the import licensing
mechanisms on the utilization of capacity in the country studies is mostly in-
direct. It consists of documentation of the allocation procedures and their like-
ly impact, with some econometric evidence relating these institutional cum a
priori arguments with excess capacity estimates. The major problem is the lack
of reliable and conceptually clear data on capacity utilization. It is perhaps
pertinent to note that, among the main reasons for the lack of reliable data on
capacity, is the fact that these data are used for allocating premium-fetching
licenses for (domestic and) imported materials on a pro rata basis, so that the
governmental agencies maintaining the capacity data (as does the Directorate
General of Technical Development in India) try to prevent upward revision of
capacity data by firms whereas the firms try to do exactly the opposite. The
final outcome depends partly or wholly on the relative ability of the two par-
ties to offer and accept unlawful emoluments. Thus, ironically, here as in
other areas, one of the casualties of exchange control systems is the ability to
analyze the inefficiencies of such systems!
Such evidence and argumentation as there is for the countries in the Proj-
ect relates to Turkey, India, Ghana, Colombia, Chile, and Pakistan. Of these,
the Pakistan and Chilean analyses are perhaps the most comprehensive
statistically so we may start with their results prior to a discussion of the other
countries.
Gordon Winston has noted that, defining full capacity output as the
single-shift maximum output, Pakistan had serious problems with capacity
utilization in a number of industries.43 Thus, in 1965 nearly half the industries
worked at about half the capacity installed. Taking the average utilization rate
for 1951-1966, nearly three-quarters of Pakistani industries had utilization
rates below 60 percent of installed capacity, and nearly two-thirds had utiliza-
tion rates below 40 percent. Winston sought to explain the capacity utilization
rates cross sectionally by regressing these rates on a number of independent
variables: ratio of exports to production (X), imports as a proportion of total
supply (M), capital-income ratio (K/Y), average annual production per firm104 ALLOCATIVEEFFICIENCY
(S), gross value added per man-hour (L), and number of firms in the industry
(A'). His result was as follows:





This led him to conclude that utilization rates were positively related to ex-
ports (which increased demand), the capital-income ratio (because lower wages
and low shift differentials in wages would lead to multiple shifts and hence to
both power K/Yand U),4-4 the number of firms in an industry (because a larger
number stimulated competition and improved utilization rates),45 and to size
(because larger firms had economies of scale and political power to get more of
the scarce inputs from the exchange control system). They were also negatively
related to imports of competing products (because they competed with
domestic production and/or may have encouraged investments in domestic
capacity in the import-substituting climate of Pakistan), and to labor produc-
tivity (for the same reason as with the capital-income ratio)!
On working with the ratio of imported raw materials to total raw
materials (RM), Winston found that:
U= 28.76 + 0.241X+ 2.838(K/Y) + 0.0245 —0.267RM
(.103)(.957) (.012)(.097) (5.2)
R2=0.70, F=9.95
indicating that the utilization rate fell as the dependence on imported materials
increased.
What do these regressions imply for the questions we have posed regard-
ing the relationship of the exchange control regime to underutilization of
capacity? Few of the independent variables here are really plausible, and RM
(raw materials) would seem to be the most convincing since, given Pakistan's
regime, the extent of capacity utilization may well vary with the availability of
imported raw materials. And, similarly, it is plausible that export promotion
should help to utilize excess capacity in import-substituting industries.
If therefore these latter results are accepted as indicative of plausible con-
nections between the independent and the dependent variables, then
Pakistan's exchange control regime may well be considered to have con-
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cess capacity could have endured over time, with growing investments inface
of shortages of imported raw materials, unless the exchange control regime
made such growth in capacity worthwhile by linking it to guaranteed equal-
shares access to imported raw materials fetching high premiums. Similarly, by
inhibiting growth of exports—a question discussed in depth in the next
chapter—the regime again would have inhibited the reduction of excess capaci-
ty, both directly and by making less foreign exchange available for imports of
raw materials.
The analysis so far has underlined the argument that the exchange control
regime in Pakistan, as elsewhere, itself created the incentives to add to capacity
despite initial excess capacity. But we may ask the different question: Why did
the authorities permit such growth of capacity to occur despite excess capacity
when in fact investment and/or capital-goods import licensing could have been
used to prevent such expansion? Nurul Islam47 argues that new firms were
licensed while existing firms operated with excess capacity on the doubtful
assumption that increasing the number of firms necessarily increased the
degree of competition. Another motivation was the desire for a wider distribu-
tion of entrepreneurship and industrial capital. Moreover, new capacity was
sanctioned with an eye to future demand. He further notes that the composi-
tion of foreign aid in terms of project and commodity assistance also had its
effect on the creation of capacity ahead of the generation of current resources
for the utilization of capacity. It was difficult to reject project assistance for
fear that aid, if not accepted, would be lost forever, and a poor country could
ill afford to forego aid. Moreover, there was always hope that the installation
of new capacity might eventually enlarge the flow of commodity aid to enable
the utilization of excess capacity. Note, however, that the willingness of the
government to expand capacity in the face of excess capacity would not be a
sufficient condition for such expansion by the private sector. Hence the critical
role in explaining such capacity expansion must be assigned to the exchange
control framework that made such expansion profitable in the first place.
The Behrman analysis of capacity utilization in Chile isfar more
thorough and addressed to the following three questions: (1) are there Phase
associations of capacity utilization? (2) have capacity utilization rates been
sensitive to foreign sector changes on a partial equilibrium basis? (3) what is
the nature of general equilibrium reponse of capacity utilization to changes in
the international economic regime per se?
On the phasewise association, Behrman concludes that such an associa-
tion is not evident for the reason that the significant determinants of capacity
utilization are domestic in nature. "Much of the importance of the foreign-
sector in the determination of capacity utilization, moreover, has been due to
wars and export market fluctuations. These phenomena are beyond Chilean
control. They clearly are not caused by any changes Chile might make in her
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In fact, Behrman's careful econometric, partial equilibrium analysis of
the determinants of capacity utilization in eight sectors (agriculture, mining,
construction, industry, transportation, utilities, housing, and services) during
1947-1965 shows strikingly the importance of several micro and macro
domestic factors such as credit availability, relative output-input prices, and
the state of economic activity in explaining underutilization of capacity. At the
same time, the foreign sector factors of importance include the stringency of
QRs. However, the signs of the coefficients in this factor go in both directions,
indicating that the beneficial effect of reduced import-competing supplies on
capacity utilization may or may not offset the adverse effect of reduced im-
ports of intermediates, spare parts, and so on.
While therefore the Chilean partial equilibrium analysis seems to yield
results that suggest a general lack of links between the exchange control
policies and the rate of capacity utilization, we can argue (as we did in the case
of the Pakistani analysis) that, as between Phase II and Phase IV on a sustained
basis, the effect of Phase IV via improved foreign exchange availability could
have been to reduce the capacity underutilization through increased availabili-
ty of imported inputs for the industry and mining sectors. But, clearly, we can-
not go beyond this for, as the Chilean analysis underlines, there are several
other factors that significantly influence capacity utilization in the different
sectors (including industry and mining). Moreover the improved availability of
foreign exchange could have been used also to increase imports of competing
products (a factor perhaps of some importance, as discussed above, in some
cases in Behrman's analysis), thus increasing excess capacity.5° It is perhaps
useful to note also that, unlike in the Pakistani case for example, the Chilean
procedures of import allocations do not appear to have created significant in-
centives to add to capacity in the face of excess capacity. Hence the effect of
the exchange control regime on the emergence or accentuation of excess
capacity (for several of the reasons discussed at the outset of this section) is
likely to have been minimal and this may therefore also help partially to ac-
count for the general lack of any link between the Chilean phases and the
capacity utilization rates.
Finally, we may note that Behrman's short-run general equilibrium
simulation runs for devaluation and for equi-proportionate increase in imports
through relaxed QRs yield the conclusion that capacity utilization through
production change would drop from such policy changes. However, these
results follow from macro price and income changes built into the model under
the devaluation simulation and, in the QR-change simulation, from the fact
that "the protective effects of quantitative restrictions on competing final
goods apparently dominate effects on imported input supplies."5' This set of
short-run results however is of interest essentially in the analysis of the transi-
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Phase II and IV on a sustained basis, one may expect lower capacity utilization
in Phase II for many of the reasons set out earlier.
The evidence for the other countries is more qualitative and, for some of
them (e.g., Colombia and Turkey), the authors again assign only a rather
modest magnitude to the effects under consideration. Thus, Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro cites relatively high utilization rates in Colombia, compared to
some other countries, and further argues that underutilization rates have been
linked by other analysts to "long-term" factors such as management quality
"which are influenced by trade policy only indirectly. Stop-go cycles related to
the foreign exchange bottleneck have influenced capacity utilization, par-
ticularly during 1956 through 1967, and excess capacity in the 'horror stories'
of import-substitution can also be found, but no strong general link appears to
existbetween importlicensingaspracticedinColombia and excess
capacity."52 The link, weak as it is, can only be inferred from the fact that the
willingness to add to capacity in the face of excess capacity would have been
higher under the direct allocations of imported inputs by INCOMEX, much as
in Pakistan and India, to Colombian firms on some fair-share basis. Also the
underutilization of capacity, linked to a shortage of imported raw materials,
provides empirical evidence in support of the pertinence of such an argument.
For India, the evidence of the links between the import control regime and
underutilization of capacity is more considerable. This is not to say that the
bulk of the substantial excess capacity in the Indian economy can be explained
in this way. Recent micro-studies have highlighted the role of factors such as
labor problems, mismanagement, and so on, in many industries; However, the
institutional work on import allocation procedures, combined with interviews
and examination of corporation reports, confirms the role of bottlenecks
resulting in substantial shortfalls in production in different firms from time to
time. Similar evidence on the inhibiting of exports by firms with underutilized
capacity is also available. And, as with Pakistan and Colombia, the evidence
of underutilization due to shortages of raw materials points to the importance
of the argument that guaranteed access to fair shares in such raw materials im-
ports, combined with sheltered markets for the output under the policy of
automatic protection from imports via QRs, would make the expansion of
capacity in the face of underutilized capacity more attractive than otherwise.
Thus, in regard to bottlenecks, it is clear that the Indian import control
regime could not have been better designed for creating such bottlenecks! The
AU (actual user) licenses (for raw materials and intermediates) were specified
in great detail by composition and by source and were besides non-transferable
between firms and, in principle, even between plants within a firm. There was
no legal provision for resale of the AU imports either.53 The creation of bot-
tlenecks, with no legal redress, was thus almost guaranteed! Redress through
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The normal, bureaucratic delays were compounded by the policy of using QRs
to protect domestic producers that was embodied in the rather sacrosanct rule
of "indigenous non-availability" as the critical factor in permitting imports.
The resulting bottlenecks were, to some extent and only with lapse of time,
eased by the growth of illegal resales of import licenses and imports and, with
the growth of the export-promoting import entitlement schemes, by the im-
ports legally made available thereunder.
The bottlenecks did not arise merely from the inflexibility endemic to AU
licensing. The strict control over CO (capital goods) and industrial licensing
also extended to regulating the composition and level of output by detailed
specification. It was therefore not infrequent to find firms that could have
technologically and profitably switched to new products, with capacity licensed
for a different product, but were prevented from so doing by the rules of
licensing. Nor was it infrequent to find firms with unbalanced equipment, seek-
ing to add marginal equipment that could have multiplied output dispropor-
tionately, unable to secure permission to do so from the licensing authorities.54
The difficulties raised by the rule of indigenous non-availability extended
also to exports. Thus, the effect of the 1966 liberalization policy package on
exports by industries with excess capacity (and hence on their capacity utiliza-
tion) was partly blunted by the inflexibilities of the control system. One of the
important side effects of the principle of indigenous availability was that ex-
portable items that therefore had to be manufactured with inferior-quality
domestically produced inputs and capital equipment were, in turn, faced with
enhanced difficulties in the highly competitive international markets. This was
particularly the case with the new exports in the engineering industries, which
in any case faced serious difficulties in cultivating foreign markets almost from
scratch. Further, since there was little flexibility for getting more inputs
through bidding in the market, in view of the restrictive character of the im-
port policy, and capacity also could not be expanded (without prior licensing)
owing to controls on entry, industries that needed flexibility in production in
order to get hold of large foreign orders, whenever available, found themselves
unnecessarily handicapped.55
There is some evidence on capacity underutilization in the Ghana study as
well, but it is somewhat inconclusive. Leith does record the presence of excess
capacity during the 1960s owing to shortages of imported raw materials and
spare parts. This phenomenon was particularly acute during the late Nkrumah
period, in 1964 and 1965, and after the coup as well. Thus, in setting out its
plea for additional aid required for 1967, the NLC government put as its goal
the attainment of "roughly some 50-55 percent of the theoretical 100 percent
capacity on a one-shift basis." According to a study by Steel, interviews in
1968 of the forty-one manufacturing firms in his sample showed that capacity
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average of less than 50 percent. Leith's own data from the CBS 1968 Industrial
Survey also showed a range of capacity utilization rates as broad as Steel's,
with an unweighted mean of 57 percent and a standard deviation of 32
percent 56
Thereforethere was indeed significant capacity underutilization in
Ghana, and Leith records that shortages of imported inputs and spares were
present. So we can infer reasonably that the exchange control regime must be
assigned some role in the phenomenon of capacity underutilization. In par-
ticular, (1) increased exchange earnings would have increased imports of raw
materials to improve capacity utilization; and (2) expansion of capacity in the
face of underutilized capacity would have been less likely if the exchange con-
trol system had not effectively linked access to producer-licenses of scarce im-
ports to capacity installed.57
Finally, Anne Krueger has also discussed the problem of excess capacity
and the exchange control regime for Turkey. She notes for Turkey,58 as other
authors did for India and Pakistan, that "import licenses were allocated
among industrialists on the basis of their capacity. Thus incentives were
created by the import-licensing system to build additional capacity even if ex-
isting capacity was underutilized." At the same time, she records the Union of
Chambers of Commerce data on capacity underutilization for 1966, 1967, and
1969, suggesting rather serious underutilization rates while also noting (as did
the India study authors) that there was an incentive to overreport capacity to
get more import allocations. Her conclusion, based on a detailed AID field
study plus her own interviews with businessmen during these years, was to dis-
count these high estimates and conclude, rather cautiously, that the "import
regime led to some overbuilding of capacity and idle capacity in some heavily
import dependent sectors" but that the magnitude of this phenomenon was
not substantial.
In conclusion, it seems reasonable to argue that several specific aspects of
the exchange control operation during Phase II, in some of the countries in the
Project, created definite inducements to the creation or accentuation of excess
capacity. However, we cannot really establish plausibly the magnitudes of
these effects. Moreover, in many cases, there were enough other, purely
domestic, factors that significantly influenced capacity utilization as well.
Hence, even in the cases where Phase II procedures may be expected to have
accentuated the creation of excess capacity, a time-series investigation of
Phase II and others would not, and in fact does not (in Chile, for example),
reveal any association between the phases and the rates of underutilization of
capacity. The only important statistical link between Phase II regimes in
general (as distinct from that resulting from allocational procedures of par-
ticular types encouraging excess capacity) and excess capacity that can be
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dices of dependence of the industry on imported raw materials. This enables us
to argue that Phase II regimes, by adversely affecting the growth of export
earnings (as discussed in Chapter 7), are likely to have consequently accen-
tuated excess capacity in the industries using imported materials.
IV. EXCESS HOLDINGS OF INVENTORIES
The exchange control regimes can also be argued to have led to increased
holdings of inventories of raw materials and intermediates, thus increasing the
social cost of production beyond what it would otherwise have been. The basic
argument centers on the fact that the exchange control regimes are characterized
by frequent changes in the assignment of imports of specific commodities
among different categories of restrictiveness and in the expected delays on
grant and disposal of licenses, phenomena that add to the uncertainty inherent
in the act of importation under any exchange regime. The increased uncertain-
ty then leads to the holding of additional inventories to reduce the risk of
losses from sudden bottlenecks in production.59 In addition, there is the in-
teresting argument that a general shift in import licensing from traders to in-
dustrialists—documented in Chapter 3 for many of our countries—also im-
plied that there would be a general increase in inventories held as the
economies of centralized holding by traders would be lost.60
The argument about individual firms holding increased inventories under
exchange control regimes however relates strictly to the firms' desire to hold
larger inventories. It may still be that the exchange control authorities may
deny to the firms the ability to hold these inventories by refusing to allocate
new import licenses unless the inventories are reduced. Hence any empirical
examination of this thesis becomes tenuous and difficult.
The evidence on excess inventory costs, in the country studies in the Proj-
ect, is mostly indirect—that is, citing the frequent changes in import policies
and classifications—but there is some direct evidence of excess holdings.
The evidence of frequency of import policy changes for specific items is
compelling for many countries. But the most detail will be found for Turkey
and India.61 There is ample documentation there of the transition of specific
items from category to category (e.g., for Turkey, items moved from the
liberalized list to quota list and back), of changing quantities of permissible
imports (within the quota list), of the inclusion and withdrawal of the item
under export-promotion licensing (e.g., under the import entitlement scheme,
or the scheme for importing at international prices, in India), and so on.
As for the direct evidence on inventory holdings, there is some evidence,
using international comparisons for similar industries, that suggests that there
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onindividual industries' inventory holdings has failed to show, so far at least,
any relationship between the stringency of the QR regime and increased inven-
tory holdings (presumably because stringency implies reduced imports and
hence this tends to pull in the direction of reduced inventory holdings).
The international comparison route has been taken also by Anne Krueger
for Turkey to supplement interviews. In particular, taking a sample of thirty-
two Turkish firms' balance sheets, as of the close of each firm's 1969 fiscal
year, she calculated the value of raw materials and other goods used in produc-
tion, excluding semi-finished and finished products. The weighted average
ratio of inventories of inputs to net fixed assets was then calculated as 0.4655,
andthe unweighted average at 0.5175,implying that inventory investment was
approximately half as large as the investment in fixed assets. Comparisons
with various countries tended to confirm impressions from the sample and
from interviews. Table 5-3, utilizing data on national accounts, contains
Krueger's estimates of the ratio of investment in inventory to fixed capital in-
vestment for a sample of countries (including Turkey). Turkish investment in
stocks averaged 15 percent of investment in fixed capital, a ratio that was more
than twice that of all countries in the sample except that of Japan and Spain.
Krueger concluded that although this high Turkish ratio "cannot be attributed
entirely to the trade regime (domestically produced goods were part of inven-
tory accumulation, too) there can be little doubt that the import regime was a
Table5-3.Ratio of Investment in Stocksto FixedInvestment, Various
Countries, 1966 to 1968
Country Ratio Country Ratio
Australia 0.080 Israel 0.030
Belgium 0.036 Italy 0.038
Brazil 0074 Japan 0.135
Chile 0.081 Korea 0.060
Denmark 0.049 Netherlands 0.054
l:rance 0.069 Spain 0.107
Germany 0.025 Turkey 0.152
Greece 0.021 United Kingdom 0.030
United States 0.065
Note: a) Data for Brazil are for the 1965-1967 period.
b) These data cover all inventory investments in all sectors and are therefore not
comparable with data from firms' balance sheets.
Source: SPO data for Turkey; Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics, United Nations,
1969, country tables for other countries; from Table VIII-2 in Krueger, Turkey, op. cit.112 ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
contributing factor in Turkey's high figure.... Nonetheless,the very high
Turkish figure combined with interview impressions and sample data suggests
that inventories were probably substantially higher as a result of the trade
regime than they would otherwise have been."63
Finally, we should note that, for Ghana, Clark Leith regressed, using
cross-sectional data for Ghanaian industries for 1968, the material stocks at
the beginning of the period as a percent of materials used during the period
(ST/USE) on the percent of imported material used in total material purchases
(IMP/TOT). He found the relationship:
ST/USE =25.48+ 0.805 IMP/TOTR2 =0.075 (5.3)
(1.480) DF=27
where the explanatory power of the equation was very low. Leith, in discuss-
ing the failure of his estimation exercise to reveal the link between inventories
and the exchange control system, notes that "while the restrictive regime may
shift the demand for inventories outward, it may also prevent the satisfaction
of that demand."65 A further reason that could imply lack of a significant rela-
tionship is that, in a cross-section analysis, the requisite assumptions to put all
industries in one regression are not necessarily satisfied to begin with; any
"prevention" of the satisfaction of demand for more inventories should affect
all industries. It seems much more likely that the cross-section analysis fails to
allow for critical differences among alternative industries and firms that affect
the dependent variable. For example, a high ratio of import dependence on
raw materials may be correlated with larger size of firms (because larger firms
are associated with the modern import-substituting sector that is characterized
by high imports of raw materials and intermediates) and larger firms may also
be better able to break bottlenecks arising from critical shortages of inven-
tories just because they have better access to the licensing authorities (as has in-
deed been discussed in Chapter 2), so that they would need to hold less inven-
tories, ceteris paribus, on that account. Cross-sectional regressions are thus
likely to yield poor results for reasons different from those that afflict time-
series analysis of this question.
Basing ourselves largely on the international-comparisons type of
evidence and the institutional evidence on licensing procedures that would
seem to create the need for holding added inventories, we may then conclude
that exchange control regimes are prone to lead to increased social costs on this
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V. EFFECTS OF CHEAP IMPORTS OF CAPITAL
GOODS AND RAW MATERIALS
One of the major aspects of the overvalued exchange rate systems in many of
the countries in the Project was that intermediates and capital goods, when im-
ported from abroad by producers under import licensing, were imported at
premium-exclusive prices and at relatively low tariffs. Hence, compared to the
situation where the parity would have been allowed to adjust, it can be argued
that such imports were artificially cheapened by these exchange control
regimes. Another aspect of the same phenomenon is that (producer-) imported
intermediates and capital goods were cheaper for the favored firms under these
exchange control regimes than were domestic substitutes.
Hence itis clear that the choice of technique by producers could be
distorted if there was substitution between domestic and imported inputs.
There is in fact plenty of evidence that, in addition to substitution between
capital goods and labor, raw materials also substitute with capital and labor.
For example, the loss of raw materials in production may be reduced by more
expensive equipment costing more capital, rejects may be reduced by better
supervision costing more salaries, and so on. Raw materials further substitute
with one another as in the Egyptian analysis of Hansen and Nashashibi where
low-quality imported and high-quality domestic raw cotton are considered as
alternative inputs in the cotton textile industry. There are both specific ex-
amples of such substitution in the literature and econometric studies, incor-
porating raw materials in the specification of the production function (for
gross output rather than for value added), which allow successfully for such
substitution.66
However, in determining the resultant impact on choice of techniques and
relative outputs of alternative sectors, it is important to distinguish between
micro-effects and macro-effects. Assuming that the overvalued exchange rate
system reduces available imports and that this translates into a lower quantity
of capital goods imports, for example, we then see readily that while each
micro-producer would have an incentive to shift his choice of technique
toward cheaper imported equipment, the reduction in the total availability of
such imports must reflect itself in the final equilibrium. It is clear then that,
given the direct allocation system, we can think of each individual choice being
biased in this way but the total demand for imported equipment being rationed
to what is feasible, so that the additional demand will be addressed to domestic
equipment (where available), which is both more expensive than imported
equipment and costlier than under a more liberal trade regime. We must think
therefore of a set of techniques where the imported equipment has been used at
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higher prices—than under a more liberal regime. Each set of choices is
distorted and suboptimal, in consequence. It also follows that the activities,
firms, and industries that are allowed access to cheaper imported equipment
(or raw materials, for that matter) will also expand relative to those that are
not so fortunate.
Evidence on such effects in the countries in the Project is found in Ghana,
Turkey, and Pakistan and points in direction of the conclusion that such
distortions were significant. For Ghana, the argumentation is confined to
micro-effects and extends to raw material imports. Basically, Leith has
estimated Cobb-Douglas production functions for three industries, using
cross-section data on establishments where gross output is defined on capital,
labor, domestic materials, and imported materials.67 He then proceeds to
estimate the implicit subsidy on imported raw materials for each industry—by
assuming that this can be defined as the proportionate cheapening of imports
relative to the average cost of importation in all industries, inclusive of import
premiums.68 Using the equilibrium factor-reward conditions, the shift in
technique following from such a subsidy, given the prices of all other factors,
can be readily worked out. However, output levels are indeterminate unless
some additional assumption such as diminishing returns to scale or increasing
supply price of at least one factor, with given output price, is made. Thus
Leith, who intends to consider not merely the shift in technique but also the ex-
pansion of output following the implicit subsidization of the imported inputs,
assumes that labor or domestic materials are subject to increasing supply price.
Using the observed prices of inputs and outputs, the estimated Cobb-
Douglas production functions and implicit subsidy on imported inputs,69 and
illustrative elasticities of supply of the factor whose supply price is assumed to
be increasing, Leith works out alternative estimates of the impact of the
cheapened imports of the inputs on supply of output in the industry and on
relative factor proportions.
The resulting empirical estimates, thus based on Ghanaian reality as far as
feasible, are nonetheless stated by Leith to be "nothing more than illustrative
of the general type of response exhibited by Ghanaian industries." However,
they suggest a significant response of output in Ghanaian industries to sub-
sidies on imported inputs and a fall in the ratio of output to these inputs, con-
clusions that carry over also to subsidized capital use as well, and hence
presumably to any cheapening of capital goods imports that results from the
exchange control regime (as discussed already).7°
The evidence from Turkey is focused on the substitution between im-
ported and domestic equipment, rather than on imported versus domestic raw
materials as in the case of Ghana. But this evidence is somewhat inconclusive,
revealing no link between the relative price of imported and domestic equipment
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and Michalopoulos, which yielded for all of Turkey during 1950-1963 the
following regression:





where 'd'd was the ratio of investment in imported to domestic capital equip-
ment, m'd the ratio of the prices of the two kinds of equipment, Re/Rd the
ratio of external to internal credit (the volume of bank loans) and D was a
dummy for the post-devaluation years (1959-1963).'
The McCabe-Michalopoulos hypothesis was that the availability of
foreign credits (official and private) largely determines total capital goods im-
ports and that the relative price of imported to domestic equipment also in-
fluences their relative use. The regression result did not, however, bear out the
latter link. This may very well have been due to the fact that the (significant)
devaluation dummy picked up this price effect. The evidence thus remains
somewhat inconclusive, especially if we further note that the indices of capital
goods prices, imported and domestic, are likely to contain more than the usual
complement of errors, that the two independent variables m'd and Re/Rd are
likely to be correlated, and that external credits do not account for all capital
goods imports while internal credits would generally not match the value of
purchases of domestic equipment.
No output-expansion and contraction effects can be deduced from the
above exercise. By contrast, the Leith exercise for Ghana did produce
estimates of output expansion in specific industries in response to the implied
subsidy on imported inputs in a partial-equilibrium framework for each 'in-
dustry. However, they rested somewhat heroically on an assumption about the
presence of "diminishing returns" from one or more (arbitrarily specified)
factors with rising supply price and the further assumption that the supply of
the imported factors would be perfectly elastic to the favored firms up to the
amount necessary to support the increased output at the new technique.
Evidence on compositional shifts in output or investment, linked to the
trade regime, is available for Turkey. Phase II periods there are associated
with relative expansion in the import-unintensive investment in construction
relative to investment in import-intensive machinery and equipment. As
Krueger notes, "the timing of the changes in importance of construction in
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the trade regime in Turkey. During Phase II, in both the 1950's and 1960's, in-
vestment became increasingly oriented toward those sectors requiring relative-
ly few imported capital goods. During Phase IV of the early 1960's investment
shifted toward plant and machinery. Evidenceof compositional shifts
linked to changes in international economic regimes is to be found in the
Chilean study as well.73
Further evidence of the impact of the trade regime on choice of techniques
comes from Pakistan. The cheap importation of capital goods under the over-
valued exchange rate to the agricultural sector has been shown to have accen-
tuated the tractorization of Pakistani agriculture in the Panjab, in the work of
Bose and Clark.74 Comparing the relative price of tractors to output (e.g.,
wheat and rice), at landed and domestic prices, these authors show that, in the
domestic market, owing to the ability of the farmers to secure imports of trac-
tors at landed (premium-exclusive) prices, the relative price of tractors was
considerably more advantageous than it would have been if the exchange rate
had been unified for imports of both tractors and agricultural outputs.
Citing Bose and Clark, Nurul Islam has argued that capital available to
the large farms in agriculture was underpriced not only because they had ac-
cess to the imported agricultural machinery at relatively low price, but also
because the large farmers had access to borrowed capital from credit institu-
tions at a rate of interest of about 6.5 percent per annum. This low rate of in-
terest compared with the shadow price of capital, which was estimated to be
between 10 percent and 15 percent. The opportunity cost of agricultural
machinery such as a stationary thresher, after correction for the overvaluation
of the domestic currency and for underpricing of capital, was estimated to be
40 percent to 60 percent higher than the market price at which it was available
substantially below its opportunity cost.
The combined result of the above factors was that from the private point
of view, mechanization in agriculture was profitable. However, its profitabili-
ty was in serious doubt from the social point of view. According to one
estimate, the social cost of tractor mechanization (evaluating all inputs in-
cluding prices of tractors in world prices and labor at zero social cost) exceeded
social benefit by 43 percent to 60 percent, depending upon the intensity of trac-
tor use varying between two acres and three acres per horsepower. The social
benefit consisted of output (evaluated in world prices) and of the opportunity
cost of fodder that would be saved consequent on the replacement of the
bullock by the tractor. However, private costs were not much higher than
social costs evaluated in world prices because tractors were available until
recently at the official rate of exchange with little or no duty. While the social
rate of discount used was 10 percent, the big farmers who were using tractors
could borrow at 6.5 percent. The only significant element of private cost not
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priceswere about 14 percent higher than social costs, excluding labor, in terms
of world prices. But private returns were considerably higher than social
returns. The evaluation of agricultural output in domestic prices was 30 per-
cent higher than world prices, and hence private returns from output were 30
percent higher than social returns, excluding the additional value of output
released from the production of fodder. Furthermore, there was the saving of
labor costs, especially in the displacement of sharecroppers or tenant farmers,
who received a larger share of output than wage labor. Nurul Islam therefore
concludes that while the precise calculations of private versus social costs and
benefits of mechanization would require further studies, the broad orders of
magnitude are clear and show that "the price structure for scarce inputs, i.e.,
capital and foreign exchange, had the effect of increasing the private returns of
mechanization above the social returns."75
The weight of the evidence in the countries in the Project then is in sup-
port of the hypothesis that exchange control regimes, by cheapening the cost
of intermediates and capital goods, influence and distort both the choice of
techniques within activities and the relative composition of outputs and in-
vestments among activities.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS EFFECTS
Before we proceed, in Chapter 7, to discuss their additional allocative effect in
the shape of discrimination against exports, we need to complete the present
analysis by reference to yet other effects of exchange control regimes.
A. Reduced Competition
The availability to domestic producers of protection against imports was a ma-
jor aspect of Phase II type regimes, as we have already noted. It should also be
noted, however, that this form of QR-generated protection could take extreme
forms, as in the Indian rule that importation of an item generally required the
production of "non-availability" certificates from indigenous suppliers, or be
operated somewhat less drastically as in Turkey or Colombia. Moreover, over
time, there is evidence that both the pressure from user industries, who were
forced to use costly and/or inferior substitutes, and also the independent
realization that automatic protection with QRs could lead to extremely high
protection, led to the establishment in many countries of modified procedures
and practices to reduce the incidence of automatic protection. Thus, in Israel,
ceilings were established on the amount of price differential that domestic im-
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materials despite the law of indigenous availability was, de facto, made
somewhat easier after the recession following the 1966 liberalization had given
way to improved levels of activity, and a cell was established in the Ministry of
Industry to monitor foreign-domestic price differentials. In Brazil, the law of
similars, parallel to the Indian law of indigenous availability, was also pro-
gressively eased. And in South Korea, automaticity in domestic protection was
progressively dismantled through the 1960s. For both Israel and South Korea,
furthermore, the use of QRs was progressively reduced and (relatively
moderate) tariff protection took over, implying that protection was no longer
total and that the import-substituting firms had to face a relatively elastic sup-
ply of imports at the tariff-inclusive price. During the bulk of the Phase II
regimes, however, the effect of the QRs was indeed to confer fairly automatic
protection to domestic production in nearly all of the countries in the Project.
Two negative consequences of this elimination of foreign competition must be
noted.
1. The lack of foreign competition could imply that the domestic firms
had less reason to be conscious of reducing costs. As Hicks once remarked, a
monopolist's chief revenue is leisure. This effect does not necessarily follow
insofar as free entry of domestic firms into production could serve to eliminate
excess costs. However, in many of the countries in the Project, such free entry
was generally not possible because of either industrial licensing or capital-
goods-imports licensing. Given raw-material-imports licensing pro rata to
capacity, efficient firms could not expand and compete effectively with the in-
efficient firms either. Hence, domestic entry was not free and the restriction or
elimination of foreign competition through use of QRs for conferring
automatic protection meant that the prospect of having effective competition
was often reduced to negligible levels. The only substantial exceptions to this
situation were to come from fortuitous overexpansion of capacity by all firms
taken together or the possibility of competitive expansion by firms using
domestic inputs and equipment outside of the control framework. Such excep-
tions were therefore generally not important.
2. The lack of attention to cost reduction was not the only consequence of
the elimination or significant reduction of competition. One could also have
monopolistic restrictionof output.Infact,given the relatively small
(economic) size of the market and the possibly large economies of scale in
many modern industries, it is clear that the elimination of foreign competition
could leave the domestic field open to successfully collusive behavior on the
part of the few firms that could supply the (small) market. The welfare losses
from such growth of domestic monopolies, in the sheltered markets created by
QRs, may be quite significant even if we rule out the cost-raising inefficiency
discussed immediately prior to the present point.76
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therefore scant, direct evidence on them in the country studies in the Project,
an excellent example being provided, however, by the case of the tire industry
in Egypt." However, there is considerable institutional evidence of the
automaticity of protection, and the methods of allocation of raw material and
capital goods licenses, to support the contention that the exchange control
regimes in many of these countries did manage to blunt competition seriously
and thus to make the economy liable to the inefficiencies of the two types just
detailed. The only systematic analysis of the effect of the reduced competition
in the Project is in regard to possible reduction in the incentives to conduct
research and development or improve quality matters taken up in Chapter 7
later.
B. Delays, Administrative Costs, and Resource Loss
The process of getting licenses allocated under the exchange control regimes
requires resource input that is likely to exceed the corresponding demands
made under a market system. This is because the bureaucratic regimes that
oversee and administer the license allocations are characterized by varying
degrees of delays arising from bureaucratic procedures, which are unlikely to
exist on the same scale in a market-oriented system. The authors of the study
of India, for which serious delays have been amply documented, argue as
follows :78
Theworking of any system of allocation will take a certain amount of time.
Even if a free foreign exchange market were to operate, the participants in the
market would have to expend time, for example, in acquiring information about
availabilities of different kinds of foreign exchange. In principle, the ad-
ministrative system of allocations need involve no significant increase in time, and
hence in "delays," over a price system under which scarce foreign exchange is ra-
tioned out in the market: the introduction of priorities would, in principle, be
equally time-consuming in both cases, though the procedure would be different,
since the price system would involve administrative decisions as to tax and subsidy
incentives whereas the control system would involve administrative decisions as to
quotas.
In practice, however, the exchange control system seems to degenerate into
an inordinately time-consuming allocational device. There are essentially three
reasons for this. (1) In a situation of general scarcity of foreign exchange, the
definition of priorities becomes exceptionally difficult..., andthe system ends
up having to accommodate all conceivable demands on some "equitable" basis,
while making a pretense of administering priorities, this pretense frequently tak-
ing the form of collection of yet more information from applicants and time
taken in "scrutinizing"it and "arriving at an informed decision." Delays
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the bureaucracy. (2) Equally important, the multiplication of the bureaucratic
apparatus leads inevitably to files failing to move quickly and decisions being
delayed because procedures are time-wasting.... muchof the delay to which the
Indian import-control system was subject can be put down to the inefficiency of
administrative procedures. For example, where indigenous clearance had to be
obtained by the DGTD [Directorate General of Technical DeveIopment from
two or more other directorates, these were to be sought sequentially rather the
simultaneously. (3) Finally, some significance must be attached in explaining
delays under the Indian allocation system, to the fact that, with files often moving
from the bottom to the top in the Indian administrative system, they often fail to
move until suitable graft is paid to the lower-level clerks. If all graft were paid
promptly, there should be no delay on this account; but newcomers and honest
applicants are unlikely to conform readily to this widespread practice, hence
delays occur on this count in the system as well.
These delays (which are also documented for restrictionist periods in
Chile79) mean, of course, that it (privately) pays firms to engage in hiring
resources (e.g., contact men) to expedite the moving of licenses and, where
corruption arises, to secure for themselves the licenses that should have gone
to others (the case of normal corruption) or licenses that should have come
their way anyway but which were being held up merely for collecting bribes
(the case of "ultimate" corruption). In short, the exchange control regimes are
likely to wind up using real resources, which could well have been utilized pro-
ductively under alternative regimes, merely in order to minimize delays and to
deflect licensed allocations in desired directions.
In addition to these losses, we must reckon the direct costs of administra-
tion that exceed the market system's costs. Not merely are the administrated
exchange allocations costly in inducing firms to expend resources in minimiz-
ing delays and maximizing access to licenses, they also are likely, in practice, to
cost more administrative resources per Se. In the absence of the constraint pro-
vided by the profit motive, the bureaucracy is likely to proliferate beyond the
optimal level necessary to administer.
Little hard evidence can be produced on these resource effects, and prac-
tically none is available for the countries in the Project. Again, however, the
evidence is inferential and relates to the great delays in licensing, the growth of
resources devoted to tackling the licensing system (in the shape of air travel to
centers of bureaucratic allocations, hiring of contact men, etc.), and the
growth of the bureaucracy in general in some of the countries in the Project,
especially India, Egypt, and Turkey, during their Phase II years.
C.OtherEffects
Finally, although the evidence on them is somewhat scant and sporadic, it is
worth noting a few additional effects. Thus, Hansen and Nashashibi note forNOTES 121
Egypt that the import-licensing policy typically failed to allow for sufficient
imports of spares for maintenance of equipment.8° This was a problem with
the Indian policy as well, and it also arose in Chile, requiring attention via ap-
propriate modifications permitting freer access to foreign exchange for the im-
portation of spare parts. Identical problems arose, of course, with the imports
of equipment for replacement.
The desire to enforce investment controls strictly was responsible for such
a policy. It also led, as in India, to preoccupation with the prevention of im-
ports of "balancing" equipment to augment capacity at low marginal cost.
The licensing authorities would frown on these as attempts to get around con-
trols on capacity. The result was often to inhibit low-cost additions to capaci-
ty. The prevention of expansion of capacity by working more shifts, and hence
economizing the use of capital, also could follow (though, as with
underutilization of capacity given the number of shifts, the factors affecting
the lack of multiple-shift working are numerous).
Then, we must also note the effect of source-tying of aid and source
restrictions via bilateral agreements on the choice of technique. Artificially
high prices of capital goods, as a result of purchases forced from more expen-
sive sources, should shift the choice of technique toward labor-intensive
goods. But in densely populated countries such as India, Pakistan, and Egypt,
where labor's shadow wage might be considered to be lower than its actual
wage, this may not necessarily be an adverse effect. On the other hand, such
source-tying could also mean importation of capital-intensive technology. For
example, U.S. machinery (imported with U.S. aid) may be more automated
then Japanese machinery. Similarly, Kidron has noted how source restrictions
have often led to strange amalgams of disparate components from different
sources into a working whole, giving the visitor to a plant in India the recur-
rent impression that he was visiting a museum.8' Needless to say, in such cases,
the productivity of the plant, so assembled, cannot have been as high as when
the equipment was put together without source restrictions in the most
economical way.
In conclusion, we may close this chapter with the judgment that, while
part of the evidence is inferential in deducing effects from the observed institu-
tional features of the exchange control regimes of the Phase II variety and only
part is direct, the overwhelming bulk of it is consistent with the view that the
static efficiency effects of such regimes have been adverse in practice.
NOTES
1. If we take "structural" models (e.g., the Feldman-Mahalanobis type of model discussed
in Chapter 6), the current allocation of investments may critically affect growth. We leave out this
and other such problems (e.g., second-best savings arguments) from the present analysis.122 ALLOCATIVEEFFICIENCY
2. Of course, it is possible to show that the long-run rate of growth asymptoticallymaybe
independent of such a productivity loss: as in R. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth," QuarterlyJournalof Economics70(February 1956):65-94.
3. Allocative inefficiency resulting from bias against exportation is discussed, however, in
Chapter 7.
4. Ghana, op.cit., Section 2. For the supporting statistics, see Table IV-2 on p. 84. Leith also
has a rough Kendrick-type calculation for Ghana; ibid, p. 82, footnote 6.
5.Israel, op.cit.,Chapter 6, Section (3),pp.159-163.
6.Israel, ibid., p.163.
7.Chile, op.cit.,Chapter 12, pp. 276-280.
8.Chile, op.cit.,Chapter 4; Colombia,op.cit.,Chapter 6; Egypt, op.cit., Chapter 2; India,
op.cit.,Chapter 2; and Turkey, op.cit., Chapter V.
9. India,op.cit.,p. 38.
10. However, as we note below, Hansen and Nashashibi have attempted a more ambitious
analysis than DRC computation for Egypt with care and ingenuity.
11. However, as noted in the next footnote, the shadow prices will equal the market prices of
factors under ad valoremtradeand product market distortions.
12. While it is relatively straightforward to argue that the appropriate shadow prices on fac-
tors should be used for calculating DRCs, their derivation is not an easy matter, either analytically
or empirically. Thus, for example, in the context of project analysis, Srinivasan and Bhagwati
("Shadow Prices for Project Selection in the Presence of Distortions: Effective Rates of Protec-
tion and Domestic Resource Costs," Journal of Political Economy 86 (February 1978):97-1 16
have shown that the valuation of factors used in the project in question must be such as to reduce
the DRCs in the existing,trade-distortedactivities to unity! On the other hand, if DRCs are com-
puted for the purpose indicated in the text above, that is, to indicate disparities in economic
returns arising from existing allocations in a regime of trade distortions, then the DRCs would
have to be computed at existing market prices of primary factors; but, to anticipate later discus-
sion in the text above, the DRC ranking would not generally reflect the relative expansion or con-
traction of activities vis-a-vis their optimal level. It might be added that, for the latter questions,
the computation of DRCs when distortions other than trade distortions are present, for example,
under factor market distortions, would presumably require some shadow pricing of factors but, as
of the present date, no theoretical exercise that does this explicitly seems to have been undertaken.
13. For this reason, Hansen and Nashashibi make their DRC estimates using both c.i.f. and
f.o.b. prices for a number of commodities in Egypt. Cf. Egypt, op.cit.
14. I. Kravis and R. Lipsey, Price Competitiveness in World Trade(NewYork: National
Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia University Press, 1971).
15. This corrective is perhaps essential as there is ample evidence elsewhere of enthusiastic in-
ferences from these arrays of ERPs and DRCs about which industries should be expanded and
which contracted, and where a planning commission is wrong in its choice of targets, and so on.
Rather we plan to use these estimates much more "weakly" as a broad piece of evidence pointing
to the general misallocation that can be inferred as likely to result from the operation of a foreign
trade regime that pays little or no attention to economic costs and benefits, without pretense that
the numbers tell you anything more than that.
16. Turkey, op.cit., pp. 219-222. A still higher variance—43,737.12—is reported for iron and
steel products, but Krueger notes (p. 224) that this result is dominated by an extreme observation
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